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Abstract: Compliance with the new European General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) and security 
assurance are currently two major challenges of Cloud-based systems. GDPR compliance implies both privacy and security 
mechanisms definition, enforcement and control, including evidence collection. This paper presents a novel DevOps 
framework aimed at supporting Cloud consumers in designing, deploying and operating (multi)Cloud systems that include 
the necessary privacy and security controls for ensuring transparency to end-users, third parties in service provision (if any) 
and law enforcement authorities. The framework relies on the risk-driven specification at design time of privacy and security 
level objectives in the system Service Level Agreement (SLA) and in their continuous monitoring and enforcement at runtime.
1. Introduction
The entry into force of the European General Data 
Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679, from now 
on GDPR) in May 2018 has definitively increased the 
concerns on better assuring privacy measures adopted by 
software systems. Privacy capabilities are intrinsically related
to security capabilities in personal data processing 
information systems. Even the GDPR itself requires that 
personal identifiable information (PII) shall be processed in 
a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal 
data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful 
processing and against accidental loss, destruction or 
damage, using appropriate technical or organisational 
measures ('integrity and confidentiality'). (Article 5.1(f)).
Therefore, there is a need to follow a holistic approach 
to risk assessment that addresses both privacy and security 
threats. This is even more challenging in (multi)Cloud-based 
systems because of the need of controlling not only system 
components’ own risks but also those of the Cloud providers. 
Security, privacy and data protection continue to be major 
barriers to Cloud adoption [1]. The users’ concerns on 
security and privacy of Cloud systems strive from the lack of 
trust, visibility and auditability of the privacy and security 
controls the Cloud providers offer in their services.
Since the arrival of GDPR, solving these issues is an 
urgent necessity for cloud consumers and providers acting as 
data processors or controllers, because the personal data 
processing principles in Article 5.1(a) 'lawfulness, fairness 
and transparency' and Article 5.2 'accountability' require 
systematic privacy assessment and evidence collection for 
assurance and transparency towards data subjects,
collaborators in processing and supervisory authorities.
In this paper we propose a novel approach to ease
assurance and transparency of Cloud-based systems by means 
of the use of Cloud Service Level Agreements (SLAs), which 
are defined as a contract framework that defines the terms and 
conditions necessary to fulfil the obligations of a Cloud 
Service Provider (CSP) for the service(s) offered to a Cloud 
Service Consumer (CSC) [2].
The paper presents our solution to SLA-based privacy 
and security assurance for (multi)Cloud applications, i.e. 
applications or services that use or have their components 
deployed in distributed Cloud services. The solution relies on
the MUSA DevOps approach to enable the complete risk-
driven life-cycle management of (multi)Cloud applications 
using SLAs. The advances brought include methods for the 
risk-driven selection of Cloud services to use, the automatic 
creation of the SLA offered by the application, and the 
continuous assurance at runtime of the security and privacy
service level objectives specified in the SLA.
The solution presented is supported by the MUSA 
framework which is an open source integrated tool suit
developed as the core result of the European Union's H2020 
project MUSA [3] and is being extended with IoT privacy 
features in the European Union's H2020 project ENACT [4].
The work herein extends previous works [5] [6] by adding 
privacy SLA analysis and the full description of the risk 
assessment process and selection of cloud services in MUSA 
based on both security and privacy controls. The MUSA 
SecAP assurance tool [5] has also been extended with 
behaviour analysis and the solution validation included 
privacy controls.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides
a review of the state of the art on Cloud SLAs usage for 
security and privacy assurance in Cloud systems. Section 3 
introduces the complete MUSA methodology and framework 
for Security and Privacy SLA Assurance in (multi)Cloud-
based systems. Section 4 presents the proposed risk-driven 
selection of Cloud services. Section 5 introduces the process 
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2to obtain the Composed SLA of (multi)Cloud-based 
applications. Section 6 presents the operational assurance
methods proposed in the solution. Section 7 introduces the 
experimental results obtained in the validation of the 
methodology. Finally, Section 8 ends the paper with 
concluding remarks on the work and future lines of research.
2. Security and Privacy SLAs in Cloud
The standard ISO/IEC 20000-1 defines a Service 
Level Agreement (SLA) as a documented agreement between 
the service provider and customer that identifies services and 
service level objectives (SLOs). With the terms Security SLA
and Privacy SLA or Privacy Level Agreement (PLA) we
therefore respectively refer to the agreements that specify
security level objectives and privacy level objectives offered 
by a service, which can be considered as part of an overall 
SLA or as complementary to agreements on other service 
level objectives, such as quality or performance SLOs.
In the Cloud Computing context, a Cloud SLA is a 
contractual agreement between the Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP) and the Cloud Service Customer (CSC) specifying the 
security grants offered by the consumed Cloud service [7].
The Cloud Security SLA and Cloud PLA would express 
respectively the security policy and privacy policy of Cloud
services offered to CSCs. And a (multi)Cloud-based system 
would therefore offer a Security SLA and PLA that depend 
on the Cloud Security SLA and Cloud PLA of the Cloud
services it uses.
2.1. Security Level Agreements in Cloud
The use of Cloud SLAs has been significantly 
explored in the last years with the aim of increasing trust in 
Cloud systems and facilitating their adoption. Recent projects 
such as SPECS [8], SLA-READY [9] and SLALOM [10] and 
guidelines such as CSCC’s [11] have significantly advanced 
in Cloud SLA reference models and Cloud SLA life-cycle 
management systems. 
Still the generation of (multi)Cloud-based system 
SLAs and their use for GDPR compliance and security 
assurance that we propose in our work remained as 
unresolved challenges so far. With our methodology we aim 
at starting the path towards full automation of security and 
privacy assurance in Cloud-based composite services.
An extract of the reference model of Cloud SLA we 
use in our approach is shown in Fig 1. The model is a 
derivation of the SPECS Security SLA model [12] where we 
have consolidated the concepts to embrace the privacy 
perspective, thus integrating Security SLA with PLA.
As shown in the model, an SLA defines the Service 
Level Objectives (SLOs) and associated controls. Controls
ensure that the Cloud service’s and/or the organisational 
CSP’s capabilities satisfy the necessary requirements derived 
from the policies, which can range from regulations (like 
GDPR) to organisational policies or orders. The SLOs are 
expressed in terms of metrics to quantitative and 
unambiguously specify the capability levels guaranteed in the 
SLA. Therefore, Security SLAs associate to each service both
the security controls that are implemented on top of it and the 
Service Level Objectives (SLOs) of the security capabilities
of the service and its provider.
In our approach we adopt the NIST Security and 
Privacy Control Framework revision 5 Draft [13] to define 
the controls, which extends the previous version of the 
framework and defines, besides security controls, privacy 
controls that are specifically devoted to meet privacy 
requirements and to manage the privacy risks in an 
organisation, and joint controls that can meet privacy and 
security requirements at a time. Security controls are defined 
by NIST as the safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for 
an information system or an organization to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and 
its information, while privacy controls are the administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards employed within an 
agency to ensure compliance with applicable privacy 
requirements and manage privacy risks.
NIST organises the controls in families, such as 
Access Control (AC), Identification and Authentication (IA), 
Risk Assessment (RA), System and Communications 
Protection (SC), System and Information Integrity (SI), etc.
And a new Privacy Authorization (PA) family has been added.
The advantages of NIST over other security control 
frameworks for Cloud such as Cloud Security Alliance's 
Fig. 1. SLA model integrating PLA and Security SLA.
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3Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) [14], ISO/IEC 27017 are its 
greater maturity, granularity of the controls and the 
integration of privacy and security controls.
The MUSA implementation of the SLA is based on 
the well-known WS-Agreement standard. The metrics to set 
the security SLOs are selected from the MUSA Security 
Metric Catalogue presented in [15] which maps security 
threats to security controls and corresponding metrics. The 
catalogue is freely available in the community [3], proposed 
and enriched with results from different research projects (e.g. 
SLALOM [10], SLA-READY [9], SPECS [8] and MUSA
[3]), standardization bodies (e.g. NIST SLA [16] and ISO) 
and consortia like The Centre for Internet Security (CIS). The 
collection of metrics therein is currently being extended to 
include a comprehensive catalogue of privacy threats, 
controls and metrics as well.
It is worth outlining that this paper explicitly addresses
the problem of proposing a methodology to support security 
and privacy issues in a technical way, clearly identifying 
privacy and security requirements and to suggest related 
countermeasures. For what regards the compliance to actual 
regulation, like GDPR, especially in terms of legal aspects
compliance, few concrete experiences are available (as an 
example [17]), and we hold over the topic for a future work.
2.2. Privacy Level Agreements in Cloud
PLAs are intended to describe a service privacy policy
in form of privacy controls. GDPR oriented PLA metamodels 
can be found in the literature [18], [19]. For Cloud services, 
standard privacy control definitions are offered by privacy 
control frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27018 for public Cloud
PII processors and the PLA for Cloud services by the Cloud 
Security Alliance (CSA), named the Privacy Level 
Agreement Code of Practise (PLA CoP) [20]. The CSA's 
PLA CoP is published as part of their Code of Conduct (CoC) 
for GDPR Compliance and it includes a PLA Template 
intended to facilitate the declaration of the level of personal 
data protection a Cloud provider offers to its customers. 
Following the template, the PLA collects the privacy and 
security provisions implemented by the CSP acting as data 
controller or data processor (depending on the case) in a
structured way in form of privacy control list.
The CSA’s PLA defines a total of 94 privacy controls 
that CSPs acting as data controllers and/or data processors 
would specify in their privacy policy. In Table 1 of 
Appendices section we propose the main relationship
between the CSA’s PLA controls, the provisions of the 
GDPR and the Security SLA controls. As seen in the table, 
we could say that the PLA contains or can refer to the Security 
SLA of the personal data, as security mechanisms applied by 
the processor on the PII are required to be expressed as part 
of the PLA. As explained in previous section, the SLA 
controls could be expressed by using those of the CSA’s
CCM [19] or any other security control framework.
2.3. SLAs for multiCloud
In general, multiCloud-based applications have their
components deployed in or their components use a priori 
independent Cloud services. Following this definition, 
federated Cloud-based and hybrid Cloud-based applications 
fall in the category of multiCloud applications too.
Therefore, the application is a CSC that can be 
considered as the composition of individual components that 
exploit Cloud resources in diverse models (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS).
The challenge is therefore the computation of the SLA
offered by the application to its customers as a function of 
how the components are deployed, the type and number of 
Cloud services they use, the relationships among the Cloud
services and among the components themselves and the SLAs 
offered by each party, i.e. components and Cloud services.
State of the art techniques of SLA composition are 
limited and mainly focused on reliability and performance 
controls using different techniques that range from ontology 
based [21] to WS-Agreement based [22].
Our approach to Security SLA composition is fully
detailed in [23] and summarised in Section 5. We are 
currently extending this solution for PLA composition in
multiCloud environments which lacks references in the 
literature yet.
3. The MUSA DevOps approach to multiCloud
Security assurance
The MUSA solution to holistic security assurance in 
multiCloud applications involves the integration of 
preventive measures and reactive measures. While MUSA 
preventive activities aim at preparing the application and 
defining its SLA including the offered security and privacy 
controls, the purpose of the reactive activities is to control the 
actual fulfilment of the defined SLA.
MUSA proposes a DevOps oriented approach to 
support all the phases of the security- and privacy-aware life-
cycle of multiCloud applications, from application privacy-
by-design and security-by-design (including the SLA 
creation) to deployment on Cloud services selected, and 
finally continuous assurance of SLA fulfillment at operation.
MUSA enables multi-disciplinary DevOps teams, which 
gather together application architects, developers, security 
architects, business managers, service operators and system 
administrators, to manage security and privacy risks in all the 
phases of the multiCloud application life-cycle. 
The complete workflow proposed by MUSA thus
involves development activities and operation activities of the 
multiCloud application as shown in Fig 2. While the last three 
activities are operation activities, the first three activities are 
development activities that can be considered security- and 
privacy-by-design practices which prepare the application to 
be compliant with security and privacy requirements and 
regulations.
The MUSA approach is supported by the MUSA 
framework (available in [3]) that seamlessly integrates 
different tools to support each of the workflow steps. The 
framework is an open source tool suit offering an integrated 
Kanban style dashboard to manage the status and progress of 
all the application components along the application
engineering process.
The whole MUSA workflow is made of six main steps 
(briefly described in the following). Next sections will detail
the SLA related activities.
Step1 Modelling: The start of the engineering process is the 
creation of the application model which specifies both the 
component level architecture of the application and its Cloud
deployment requirements. The model is created in MUSA 
extended CAMEL language as explained in [24]. The model 
is a Cloud Provider Independent Model (CPIM) where Cloud
requirements of the components are defined without 
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4references to the actual Cloud services that will be selected 
for the deployment in the next step. The purpose of the model 
is therefore to define which are the application components, 
which are their communication relationships, which type and 
location of Cloud services they need, which are their Cloud
resources needs (e.g. size of VM memory, CPU, etc.) and 
which are the enforcement agents that will optionally operate 
with them to implement a required security or privacy control
(see Section 6).
Step 2 Risk-driven Cloud Services selection: In this step the
actual Cloud services to use by the application components 
will be selected so as they match both the requirements stated 
in the application model expressed as required Cloud
resources and the application risk profile. The risk profile is 
the result of the risk assessment process carried out by 
analysing the threats against the application components and 
selecting the desired treatments or controls. This process is 
supported in MUSA framework by the MUSA Decision 
Support Tool (DST) and detailed in Section 4 below.
Step 3 Creation of Composed SLA: This step consists in the 
generation of the (multi)Cloud application SLA that can be 
offered to its clients. The tool in the MUSA framework which 
supports this functionality is the SLA Generator. The SLA 
granted will be computed as the composition of the SLAs of 
the application components and the SLAs of the Cloud
services used after an SLA validation process to learn the
actual controls that can be effectively supported. The
composition methodology is summarised in Section 5.
Step 4 Deployment: Once the Cloud services to use are 
selected and the Composed SLA is obtained, the components 
of the application will be automatically deployed and the 
Cloud resources initialised and configured as needed. The 
monitoring and enforcement agents to be used together with 
the components are also deployed and configured in this step. 
They will be the responsible for controlling at operation that 
the application behaves as promised in the SLA. This step is 
supported in MUSA framework by the MUSA Deployer, an 
open source multiCloud broker and deployer that supports 
OpenStack, Eucalyptus and Amazon AWS.
Step 5 Monitoring of Composed SLA: The main objective of
compliance and security assurance is to make sure that the 
Composed SLA holds during application provisioning. This 
is ensured in MUSA by continuously monitoring the security 
and privacy levels through metrics defined in the Composed 
SLA. The monitoring functionality in the MUSA framework 
is supported by the MUSA Security Assurance Platform that 
will be described in Section 6. 
Step 6 Enforcement of Composed SLA: In case actual or 
potential violations of the promised SLOs are detected, it is 
necessary to try to enforce the SLOs and take prompt 
remediation actions to avoid the violation or to recover the 
security and privacy behaviour as soon as possible. The cause
of the violation of the Composed SLA may reside in a failing 
application component (including enforcement agents used) 
or a failing Cloud service (i.e. the CSP is not fulfilling its 
Cloud SLA). Depending on the failing SLO, reaction actions 
may be procedural activities carried out by the DevOps team
(e.g. the redesign of the application to update the architecture 
and include enforcement agents like the MUSA access 
control agent) or automatic enforcement mechanisms 
supported by the multiCloud application itself (e.g. the 
activation of a data encrypting component) a or by external 
systems (e.g. the activation of a vulnerability scanner). The 
enforcement agent management in MUSA framework is part 
of the MUSA Security Assurance Platform too, as explained 
in Section 6. 
The agile and DevOps paradigms are achieved by two 
main iteration loops in the workflow. First, at design time the 
initial CPIM model of the application (in Modelling) and/or 
its risk profile (in Risk-driven Cloud Services selection) are
revisited by the DevOps team until the Composed SLA 
satisfies all the requirements expressed in both, i.e. until the
application architecture and Cloud deployment plan enable to 
grant a feasible Composed SLA that includes only those 
controls and levels that can be effectively granted after the 
selection of the Cloud services to use. Second, at operation 
time, in case a CSP is identified as the cause of the Composed 
SLA violation, in order to solve the situation and replace the 
Cloud service, a redeployment action is tried which would 
include a new risk assessment iteration. 
Following we detail the SLA-related MUSA activities
in order to show the crucial role of SLAs for compliance and 
security assurance in multiCloud-based systems.
4. Risk-driven Selection of Cloud services for 
multiCloud
In the context of (multi)Cloud applications the 
challenges associated to privacy-by-design and security-by-
design principles increase, due to the possible lack of control 
over the involved assets in those cases where assets are under 
the control of external CSP or when assets are elastic, for 
example, a cluster composed of a varying number of virtual 
machines. Both scenarios make it difficult to evaluate the 
level of risks associated and they illustrate the main
Fig. 2. MUSA DevOps workflow for SLA-based security assurance in multiCloud
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5difference existing between Cloud Security and Security in 
System Engineering. Security in system engineering assumes 
that the system under design is completely under control of 
the designer and it is possible to identify assets and configure 
them according to the privacy and security requirements at 
every level of the system architecture. In Cloud-based 
applications, the assets are frequently under CSPs’ control, 
continuously vary in time and it is less possible for Cloud
application designers to impose constraints over their 
implementation, the attack surface is blurred and new 
techniques are needed to satisfy privacy and security 
requirements [25].
With the aim to address (multi)Cloud risk challenges 
we adopt the SLA-based approach where we rely on the 
existence of a Security SLA (and PLA) associated to each 
application component that is not under control of the 
designer and is offered as a service (i.e. is a Cloud service 
consumed by the application). Such Security SLA would 
express the security levels granted by the Cloud service 
expressed as SLOs measurable by security metrics. Similarly, 
Cloud PLA would reflect its privacy SLOs and metrics.
In the following we detail how the selection of the 
Cloud services is made based on the analysis of the threats 
associated to application components and how the Cloud
services’ SLAs may tackle them.
4.1. Continuous risk assessment 
The risk assessment process in MUSA is considered 
the key driver to Cloud services selection decision support. 
Depending on whether the multiCloud application processes 
PII, risks may involve not only security concerns but also 
risks to data privacy. MUSA promotes that risk evaluation is 
a continuous task where multiple perspectives of organisation 
roles should take part. Whenever the application architecture 
changes or whenever the security and/or privacy status at 
runtime is in alert the DevOps team should perform a new 
risk assessment iteration, which involves the following sub-
steps:
4.1.1. Identification of Threats against components: In 
order to assess the risks in the different components of the 
application, in MUSA we use a risk model based on the 
OWASP threat risk modelling [26]. The DevOps team
chooses the threats that the component under consideration is 
susceptible to. These threats may be chosen from a threat 
catalogue such as that included in the MUSA Security 
Metrics Catalogue [15], which describes potential threats to 
different service types taken from expert sources such as the 
OWASP TOP 10 threats catalogue.
The security threats selected are classified in the 
STRIDE [27] categories (Spoofing identity, Tampering, 
Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service and 
Elevation of privilege). The DevOps team is required to 
provide the likelihood and impact of each threat and the 
Composite Risk Index (CRI) of each threat is evaluated as in 
(1):
ܥܴܫ ൌ ܮ݈݄݅݇݁݅݋݋݀ כ ܫ݉݌ܽܿݐሺͳሻ
Both Likelihood and Impact are computed on a scale 
of 1 to 9 whilst the product is quantized on a scale of 1 to 5. 
This implies that the CRI ranges from 1 to 25. In our Decision 
Support Tool (DST) prototype, the likelihood and 
consequence scales chosen are inspired from [28] and for 
simplification of the process, the DevOps team is provided
with default values of the threat factors with the flexibility to 
change them at every stage of the risk assessment.
In MUSA risk assessment, the Likelihood and Impact 
values are further computed from a set of categorisations-
based influencers taken from OWASP approach to the CRI
[26], where Likelihood factors include Threat agent factors
and Vulnerability factors, while Impact factors can be either 
Technical factors or Business factors. The sub-values 
influencing CRI are grouped by the type of factor and 
represented by the likelihood of the factor to occur in a scale 
of 0 to 9, ranging from very unlikely (0) to very likely (9) 
scenarios. A detailed description of all the concerning factors
is available in [26], while a more extensive description of the 
process can be found in [28].
In order to ease the risk definition, it is advisable that 
the Technical Impact factors are pre-set with values based on 
the type of component and nature of the threat. This is how it 
is done in the threat catalogue within MUSA Security Metrics 
Catalogue. Business Impact factors on the contrary are not set 
to default values due to their dependency to the assessed 
business in question. Therefore, it is necessary that the user 
always sets the values of the Business Impact factors.
4.1.2. Security controls definition: In this step the DevOps 
team indicates the security controls that may mitigate the 
identified threats. After evaluating the threat scores, threats 
are identified as those requiring treatment (high and medium 
risk level) and those that may not require treatment (low risk 
level). This classification is made depending on the threat 
CRI level.
NIST [13] provides the security and privacy controls 
for the threats and the threat levels that require treatments. 
Based on this mapping, the DST prototype obtains the 
required controls for the threats selected by the DevOps team.
These controls are then presented to the DevOps team as 
suggestions but they are free to extend the choice to all the 
available security controls if desired. Selected controls are 
further mapped to the CSA’s CCM controls [14]. These
controls are later used for the Cloud service selection. 
4.1.3. Risk mitigation status definition: The last step 
required from the DevOps team is the acceptance of the level 
of the risk mitigation status. In our approach we have 
leveraged the ROAM model risk mitigation classification
[28]. ROAM is a common agile management risk mitigation 
classification that, according to the countermeasures applied,
classifies each threat as: (i) Resolved, in case the risk has 
been answered, avoided or eliminated; (ii) Owned, for risks
that have been allocated to someone who has responsibility 
for addressing them; (iii) Accepted, if the risk has been 
accepted and no further actions are required to address it; (iv)
Mitigated, if an action has been taken (i.e. controls are set) 
to mitigate the risk, either reducing its likelihood or reducing 
its impact.
It is pertinent to remark that only threats with status 
Accepted and Mitigated can be considered as fully addressed.
Threats with status Owned are treated as a 'pending' while 
Resolved threats are considered no longer relevant. All these 
status need to be considered in the subsequent iterations of 
the continuous threat assessment.
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6The final output of the risk analysis process is the risk 
profile of the application in form of the list of security 
controls required from the Cloud providers, specified per 
threat and per component so as to mitigate the identified risks.
4.2. Cloud Service Selection on the basis of 
offered controls
Once the risk profile is finished, a Cloud service 
match-making process starts to select the services that best 
match the controls and the requirements in the CPIM model.
4.2.1. Identification of the appropriate CSPs: In order to 
provide the DevOps team with the set of Cloud services that 
meet the requirements, the DST prototype is able to look up 
into multiple datasets. One of the most important data sources 
for the discovery of the appropriate CSPs is an online version 
of CSA STAR database in CAIQ format [30] where CSPs 
have made available the results of their security self-
assessment, indicating the CCM security controls they offer.
The DST tool is able to consume the source dynamically and 
process it. Through the responses of the CSPs in the CAIQ 
and through the reference mapping provided by CSA in [14],
the DST retrieves the security controls that are provided by 
the different CSPs. Another method to make this
identification is by using the CCM matrix mapping for 
security controls to the certification clauses. The DST 
identifies the public declaration of the certificates hold by the 
CSPs (available through CAIQ) and identifies in the matrix 
the security controls provided by those certifications. 
As the Risk Assessment phase output is provided in 
the DST prototype in NIST [13] format, the tool is then using 
the repository of security control families and cross-
certificate mapping proposed by CSA STAR, in order to 
discover the relationships between the NIST and CCM 
security controls. It is almost entirely mapped in a many-to-
many relation fashion. This way the MUSA DST identifies 
the CSPs that meet the security controls provisioning that 
guarantees the threat treatment for each component selected 
by the user.
4.2.2. Ranking the services based on the risk profile: In 
order to evaluate and rank the Cloud services on the basis of 
their capability to address the security requirements of the 
multiCloud application, we use the risk response evaluation 
method proposed by Dorfman [31]. This evaluation 
mechanism is used to identify the extent of threat mitigation 
provided by the different controls and consequently, what is 
the overall extent of risk mitigation capability that is provided 
by the CSP. Using this evaluation it is possible to rank the 
providers according to the percentage of user requirements
fulfillment. It also provides an insight to the user as to which 
threats are mitigated by a provider and the scope of the
mitigation.
The resulting score is an average value of fulfilment 
of aggregated security controls from all the controls hosted in 
the same Cloud service. The fulfilment value of a security 
control in NIST is an average of all the influencing CCM 
controls and their level of fulfilment by the provider in 
question. The connection between the Cloud service (e.g. 
hosting virtual machine) and the component is described in 
the CPIM of the multiCloud application.
4.2.3. Final decision: Once the alternative Cloud service 
combinations are ranked by multiCloud application 
requirements fulfilment percentage, the DevOps team will 
need to make the final choice of which combination to use. 
This is a human decision-making process aided by the 
ranking information presented. The decision should be taken 
from a multi-disciplinary viewpoint, preferably involving
several actors in the DevOps team in order to enrich the 
decision. Other business factors and performance factors may 
affect the decision and should be considered.
In those cases where the percentage of security 
requirements fulfilment is not satisfactory for the DevOps 
team, a new iteration process may be started by updating the 
security controls required in the Risk Assessment phase, i.e. 
by updating the risk profile.
The final selected combination of services is passed to 
the Composed SLA Generation step described below.
5. Creation of Security SLA for multiCloud
The SLA composition methodology we propose is
fully explained in [23]. Herein we provide a brief description 
for the sake of understandability of the overall MUSA 
methodology and workflow.
The methodology aims at creating a machine-readable
Security SLA of the overall multiCloud application by 
considering the dependencies of the components among them 
and with the Cloud services they use.
The ultimate goal is to obtain an SLA that includes the 
security controls that can be granted by the multiCloud
application to its consumers to be later monitored at runtime.
This is what we call the Composed SLA, which is in fact the 
set of controls that can be effectively promised for each 
application component. The controls would be security 
and/or privacy mechanisms implemented by the component
(or by the MUSA enforcement agents that work with the 
component, if any) or required on the Cloud service it uses.
The methodology consists in the following sub-steps:
x Per-component SLAT creation: From the per-
component threat identification and risk assessment 
step described in Section 4.1.1, the goal is to obtain 
the SLA Template (SLAT) that describes the desired
SLOs for each component. Therefore, the DevOps 
team associates the SLOs (metrics and metrics values)
to each of the desired security controls. These controls 
are desired in the sense that they do not take into 
account yet the final deployment context.
x Per-component SLA assessment: The process 
translates the SLAT of each of the component into the 
SLA that it can grant. The DevOps team will need to 
perform a detailed security review of the component 
by answering a questionnaire we developed to this aim, 
which is the result of the combination of security 
assessment methodologies and best practices such as 
OWASP ASVS 2.0 questions, Berkley DB Best 
Practices, security controls definition from NIST and 
CSA CAIQ[30].
x Per-application SLA assessment: The starting point is 
the Multi-Cloud Application Model (MACM) derived 
from the application CPIM model created in the initial 
Modelling step. The MACM captures the deployment 
architecture as well as the relationships among the 
services composing the application (e.g. uses, 
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7provides, hosts, etc.). The application level assessment 
consists in reasoning over such relationships by 
applying the composition rules on a per security 
control basis. The composition assumes the controls
can be independently evaluated and different 
composition rules are defined depending on the type 
of control.
Remarkably, in this technique it is necessary to 
include the selected MUSA enforcement agents, if any, which 
would implement security and privacy mechanisms and thus 
would have to be part of the MACM and follow the 
assessment process to learn the SLA they can grant so as it 
can be taken into account in the composition.
The outcome is the Composed SLA of the multiCloud
application that will be deployed, which contains only those 
controls that can be granted by the components. The current 
SLA Generator prototype is capable to inform on the 
composition results explaining the detail traces and causes of 
the non-inclusion (if any) of particular security controls in the 
Composed SLA.
6. SLA-based Security Assurance in multiCloud
Just after successful deployment of both application 
components and their corresponding agents, the operation 
and monitoring of the running (multi)Cloud application start.
MUSA solution proposes the Composed SLA-based 
operational assurance and the automation as much as possible 
of the security and privacy level control and enforcement. In 
this section we describe the MUSA Security Assurance at 
operation supported by MUSA Security Assurance Platform 
(MUSA SecAP). The complete description of the 
methodology and the platform is provided in Error! 
Reference source not found..
The methodology involves the Monitoring and 
Enforcement activities of the MUSA workflow depicted in 
Fig 2, as follows.
6.1. Continuous Monitoring of Composed SLA 
fulfilment
The security and privacy levels promised to 
multiCloud application customers are continuously under 
scrutiny by DevOps team who keep tracking whether the 
metrics defined for the controls are reaching the target levels 
(SLOs). Currently the metrics available in MUSA SecAP are 
a set of security metrics and privacy metrics from MUSA 
Security Metrics Catalogue. See more info in MUSA
deliverable D4.4 in [3].
Security SLA violations occur when it is detected that 
a security SLO in the SLA is not reached. Similarly, a PLA 
violation happens when a privacy SLO is not reached.
In case any SLO is at risk (the threshold level is about 
not to be reached) an alert is triggered and a notification 
raised to the DevOps team and other stakeholders subscribed 
to the alerting system for them to be able to rapidly react and 
solve the issue.
The main modules in MUSA SecAP that support the 
Composed SLA monitoring are the Monitoring and 
Notification services, supported by the Monitoring agents.
The Monitoring service is in charge of supporting 
metrics measurement, persistence, root cause analysis and 
alert triggering. The service extracts from the Composed SLA 
the required security and privacy metrics and metric 
objectives and it configures the monitoring agents (see below) 
accordingly.
The Notification service is the main service for 
ensuring transparency. It is responsible for providing visual 
information on situational awareness, notifying the DevOps 
team on security and privacy incidents detected, and 
generating evidence reports from the measurements. The 
service relies on user subscription to alerts and events they 
would like to be informed on.
Four Monitoring agents are offered in MUSA which 
are automatically deployed and work together with the 
multiCloud application components as follows:
x The Network monitoring agent analyses the network 
traffic from different network interfaces of the virtual 
machines or containers where the components are 
deployed. The agent uses an advanced rules engine
able to correlate network events to detect performance, 
operational and security incidents.
x The System monitoring agent detects server 
performance degradation and bottlenecks by 
monitoring operating system resources. The agent 
relies on Linux top command to monitor performance
(e.g. running processes, CPU usage, Memory usage, 
Cache Size, etc.).
x The Application monitoring agent monitors
execution details and other internal conditions of the 
multiCloud application component in which it is 
deployed.
x The Behaviour monitoring agent learns the behaviour 
of users/systems using the component and creates 
activity profiles for each object/user on the basis of 
volume of data for the specific category of application 
component.
6.2. Reaction to violations of Composed SLA
Whenever an SLO violation or alert event occurs, the 
Monitoring service in the MUSA SecAP would detect it and 
the DevOps team would be informed on time by the 
Notification service. The incident information would include 
all the necessary information about the failing measurement 
together with the identified cause and the recommended 
reaction action. Depending on the cause, the DevOps team 
reacts applying one of the following processes.
Activation of a MUSA security enforcement agent:
MUSA security enforcement agents are preventive security 
mechanisms or controls that are managed through a message 
broker by the MUSA Enforcement service in MUSA SecAP.
As long as the application CPIM required the use of the 
enforcement agent to protect a component, it is possible to 
manage the agent at runtime. Thus, in case the failing SLO 
can be solved by the activation or re-configuration of the 
agent, the MUSA SecAP would recommend it to the DevOps 
team. The three basic enforcement agents offered by the 
MUSA framework are the following:
x The high availability (HA) framework which is based 
on the Corosync/Pacemaker stack and provides high 
availability clustering mechanisms such as scalability, 
load balancing, automatic failover and routing 
between services, and secure communications. 
x The identity management (IdM) agent that guarantees
that only authorised end-users can access application 
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8component services. It supports OpenID Connect and 
OAuth 2.0.
x The access control (AC) agent: An XACML policy-
based ABAC component that ensures that only 
authorised requesters with authorised attributes can 
consume services in application component. It relies 
on component local Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) 
and Policy Decision Point (PDP) to increase the 
performance. 
Activation of a MUSA privacy enforcement agent:
The privacy enforcement agents are similar to security 
enforcement agents and their duty is to implement privacy 
specific controls whenever needed at operation. Note that 
these agents would be required only in those cases where PII 
is processed by the multiCloud application. For example, the 
privacy agents could be responsible for automatically 
implementing data subject's changing processing options 
according to collected consent, data retention periods or 
purpose limitations. We are currently developing privacy 
agents that can be managed as external agents to the 
application through the MUSA SecAP enforcement 
dashboard. The key challenge is to make the agent reside 
external to the components while still avoiding security issues 
such as data leaks between the component and the agent.
Re-deployment of multiCloud application: When the 
cause of the detected violation is a failing Cloud service used 
by one or more components, it would be necessary to replace 
it with some other Cloud service offering the same
functionality and security controls. The MUSA DST will 
support the DevOps team in searching for the replacement 
and the MUSA Deployer in deploying again the components 
that were using the defective service. It is recommended to 
launch a new iteration from risk assessment step to ensure that 
the new Cloud service combination with the new Cloud 
Service still holds the risk profile and requirements.
Re-design of multiCloud application: In case the 
cause of the violation is a failing component and not a 
defective CSP, the DevOps team would need to study the 
cause and correct the failing component code if that is the 
case, or start the MUSA workflow by Modelling phase where 
they would update the CPIM model to refine the architecture 
requirements, include protection components or specify the 
use of MUSA security or privacy enforcement agents that 
offer such missing controls (if available). 
7. Validation
Our MUSA SLA-based security assurance approach 
and the supporting tools in MUSA framework have been 
evaluated in the creation and operation of two real-world 
multiCloud-based systems:
x Flight scheduling application prototype by Lufthansa 
Systems, Germany. The analysis of this case study 
was focused on data integrity, confidentiality, data 
location and access control. 
x Tampere Smart Mobility (TSM) application by 
Tampere University of Technology, Finland. In this 
case study we mainly analysed the potential of MUSA 
DevOps SLA-based approach to ensure high 
availability, data integrity, confidentiality and privacy 
of users’ personal data such as their mobility footprint.
The validation in both use cases followed the same 
methodology. A MUSA-independent DevOps team was 
created gathering experts from development, security, service 
administration, business areas, etc. of the organisation. After 
dedicated training sessions on the MUSA framework concept 
and tool usage, they were required to go hands on with MUSA 
tools to engineer and operate the multiCloud application. The 
process followed corresponds to the workflow of Fig 2.
While the benefits of using MUSA for Flight 
scheduling prototype are described in [32], in this paper we 
will summarise the results for TSM multi-modal and energy 
efficient mobility application shown in Fig 3. As it can be 
seen, this application includes some internal components (in 
blue): a Journey Planner that calculates the optimum route, an 
energy Consumption Calculator, a Database that stores users’ 
journey profiles and the Identity Management Module (IdM)
for the authentication of the users, and finally the TSM 
Engine which is a Web service in charge of orchestrating the 
other components. Note that the IdM component can also be 
replaced by an external IdM. The application uses also SaaS 
services (in green) like weather forecasts (FMI), (Google 
directions) and other open data and services from the 
Intelligent Transport Systems and Services (ITS) Factory of
Tampere City.
Fig 3 also shows (in orange) a possible simple deployment 
using two IaaS services for the internal components. By 
following the MUSA workflow, this is the type of 
information that the DevOps team expressed in the CPIM of 
the application in the initial Modelling step (see Section 4)
together with the selected enforcement agents for the 
components (see section 6.2). Initially no MUSA agent was 
selected for TSM application. Then, the DevOps team 
followed a per-component risk assessment (see Section 5) 
and the security and privacy controls were selected for all the 
internal components’ SLAs. With this risk profile an initial 
selection of the Cloud services to use was made. 
As part of the SLA Composition step, from the CPIM 
model an extended version of the MACM model shown in 
Fig 4 was created as the basis for the composition reasoning.
The desired controls in the risk profile were assessed 
and validated in the computation of the Composed SLA.
As part of the SLA composition process, some of the
initially selected controls were drop off from the final 
application SLA, e.g. high availability, due to the MUSA HA 
agent was not selected in this application version and the
availability of the selected Cloud services would not enough
to meet the desired target (SLO >= 99.98\%). Nevertheless,
the selection of Cloud services was decided not to be changed.
An excerpt of the identified threats for TSM Engine 
(TSM) and Database (DB) components and a partial list of
Fig. 3. TSM multiCloud application deployment
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9the corresponding controls in NIST [13] and metrics is 
provided in Table 2 of Appendices section. See MUSA 
deliverable D4.4 in [3] for the complete list.
In the deployment phase, the components were 
successfully deployed using the MUSA Deployer which 
automatically deployed the MUSA monitoring agents too 
(see Section 6.1) to be able to measure the specified metrics. 
At operation phase, the monitoring of the security 
metrics in the Composed SLA allowed the application of a set 
of detection rules which raised diverse alarms in application 
components. For example, to evaluate the efficiency in access 
control protection, we launched an access attempt from an 
unauthorised source and the Notification service immediately 
raised a violation alarm to the DevOps team together with the 
recommendation to Use the AC agent with the TSM engine 
component. The DevOps team re-designed the application 
including the MUSA AC agent to be deployed with TSM 
engine. This way the AC agent was activated and helped to 
recover from the incident. In a further development iteration, 
the DevOps team decided to replace the AC agent by the HA 
agent which provides both the required availability and AC 
protection in a single agent. The same mechanism could be 
used for protecting access to personal data in DB.
Additional security monitoring and reaction strategies 
supported by MUSA SecAP for DoS, identity thefts, use of 
vulnerable components, etc. were evaluated successfully.
Other examples include DB component privacy 
protection like the activation of a personal data eraser when 
the MUSA SecAP detected that the disposal date specified in 
the SLA was passed.
8. Conclusions and future work
Compliance with GDPR and security assurance in 
multiCloud-based systems are two major challenges 
obstructing trust and Cloud adoption.
In this paper we have proposed a novel methodology 
for SLA-based security and privacy assurance in Cloud and 
multiCloud-based systems that seamlessly integrates
security-by-design, privacy-by-design and quantitative 
assurance at operation. It relies on the use of the Security 
SLAs and PLAs as the instruments to gain transparency and 
systematization of the assurance of security and privacy 
measures offered by the Cloud-based systems and their 
providers. Security SLAs and PLAs formalise the definition 
of both information protection functionality and assurance 
level, for security and privacy capabilities respectively.
The MUSA approach and its supporting open source
tool suit, the MUSA framework, have been proved to enable
the security-aware design as well as continuous security 
assurance and evidence collection based on metrics specified 
for application SLOs defined in the Composed SLA.
Assurance in multiCloud applications requires the holistic
control of multiple security and privacy capabilities at 
different components and layers of Cloud. To this aim we
propose to adopt joint security- and privacy-by-design 
strategies as part of a complete DevOps approach for the 
prompt reaction to incidents at runtime. 
The contributions brought by our approach include: (i)
the integration of privacy and security assurance in a single 
DevOps workflow that supports agile and multi-disciplinary 
holistic and continuous risk assessment, (ii) novel SLA
Composition mechanisms that to obtain multiCloud SLAs 
that are machine-readable and based on security and privacy 
standards (NIST, CSA) and (iii) operation assurance 
mechanisms for ensuring Composed SLA fulfilment and 
early detection of security and privacy flaws in the 
application components and used Cloud services.
The framework is currently being improved by 
optimising the SLA composition techniques and the root 
cause analysis. We are also working in extending the solution
for supporting a complete set of privacy controls and metrics.
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11. Appendices
Table 1 Proposed CSA’s PLA relationship with GDPR and security controls in Security SLA 
PLA requirement PLA control GDPR requirement
1. CSP Declaration of 
Compliance and Accountability.
DCA-1.1 to DCA-1.4 Art. 24 - Responsibility of the controller, Art. 28 -
Processor
2. CSP Relevant Contacts and its 
Role.
CAR-1.1 to CAR-1.5 Art. 24 - Responsibility of the controller, Art. 26 -
Joint controllers, Art. 27 - Representatives of 
controllers or processors not established in the 
Union, Art. 28 - Processor, Art. 29 - Processing 
under the authority of the controller or processor
3. Ways in which the Data will be 
Processed.
WWP-1.1 to WWP-1.15, 
WWP-2.1, WWP-3.1 to 
WWP-3.5, WWP-4.1 to 
WWP 4.2, WWP-5.1 to 
WWP-5.9
Art. 25 - Data protection by design and by default
4. Recordkeeping. REC-1.1 to REC-1.8, REC-
2.1 to REC-2.5
Art. 30 - Records of processing activities
5. Data Transfer. DTR-1.1 to DTR-1.2 Chapter 5 (Art. 44 – 50) - Transfers of personal 
data to third countries or international organisations














Art. 32 - Security of processing, Art. 5 - Principles 
relating to processing of personal data 1(f) –
integrity and confidentiality.
7. Monitoring. MON-1.1 Art. 4 (1). The information provided to the public 
and to data subjects, Art. 5 - Principles relating to 
processing of personal data 1(a) -transparency
8. Personal Data Breach. PDB-1.1 to PDB-1.7 Art. 33 -Notification of a personal data breach to 
the supervisory authority, Art. 34 -Communication 
of a personal data breach to the data subject, Art. 5 
- Principles relating to processing of personal data 
1(a) - transparency
9. Data Portability, Migration and 
Transfer Back.
PMT-1.1 to PMT-1.2 Art. 20 - Right to data portability
10. Restriction of Processing. ROP-1.1 Art. 18 - Right to restriction of processing, Art. 5 -
Principles relating to processing of personal data 
1(b) - purpose limitation and 1(c) - data
minimisation
11. Data Retention, Restitution 
and Deletion.
RRD-1.1 to RRD-1.2, RRD-
2.1, RRD-3.1, RRD-4.1 to 
RRD-4.5
Art. 16 - Right to rectification, Art. 17 - Right to 
erasure (‘right to be forgotten’), Art. 5 - Principles 
relating to processing of personal data 1(d) -
accuracy and 1(e) - storage limitation.
12. Cooperation with The Cloud 
Customers.
CPC-1.1 to CPC-1.2 Cooperation with data subject to fulfil Chapter 3 
(Art. 12 – 23) -Rights of the data subject
13. Legally Required Disclosure. LRD-1.1 Art. 31 - Cooperation with the supervisory 
authority
14. Remedies for Cloud 
Customers.
RMD-1.1 Art. 77 - Right to lodge a complaint with a 
supervisory authority, Art. 79 - Right to an 
effective judicial remedy against a controller or 
processor.
15. CSP Insurance Policy INS-1.1 Art. 82 - Right to compensation and liability
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Table 2 TSM application controls and metrics (partial lists for TSM Engine and DB components)
(Type* key: S-X: security control, where X can be S/T/R/I/D/E as in STRIDE model; P: privacy control, J: joint 
control)




Metric in MUSA 
Metric Catalogue
Reaction in MUSASecAP Comp
Denial of service S-D SC-5
Level of redundancy Deploy additional containers. TSM, DB
Service availability
Depends on the root cause: 
redeploy the VM, restart the 
application
Account Hijacking S-E
IA-5 User account measure, Identity assurance
Use stronger authentication 
mechanism (e.g. 2 factor 












S-E AC-6 User account measure, Identity assurance
Use 2 factor authentication 
mechanism, Use MUSA AC agent TSM
Access token leak 
in Transport 
/Endpoints





IA-5 User account measure, Identity assurance
Use 2 factor authentication 
mechanism, Use MUSA AC agent TSM, 
DB
AT-2 HTTP to HTTPS redirects Use HTTP/HTTPS proxy
Using components 
with known vuln. S-I RA-5
Vuln. scanning 





IA-5 User account measure, Identity assurance
Use 2 factor authentication 
mechanism, Use MUSA AC agent
TSM, 
DB
SC-23 Identifiers quality, data encryption Use randomizer for identifiers DB
Injection flaws S-T SI-10 Injection flaw type
Deploy a new version of software 





access to personal 
data
P SI-4(25) User account measure, Identity assurance
Use 2 factor authentication 
mechanism, Use MUSA AC agent DB
J SI-6 Availability of Priv.verification service Deploy privacy verifier DB
Personal data 
disclosure P SI-20(1) Level of anonymisation





P SI-18 Information disposal due date and time Activate eraser on time DB
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